We propose two constructions of chosen-ciphertext secure identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes. Our schemes have a security proof in the standard model, yet they offer performance competitive with all known random-oracle based schemes. The efficiency improvement is obtained by combining modifications of the IBE schemes by Waters [41] and Gentry [23] with authenticated symmetric encryption.
Random Oracles. The drawback of all the IBE schemes [12, 8, 36, 18] that are currently under submission to the new IEEE P1363.3 standard is that their security can only be guaranteed in the random oracle model [4] , i.e. in an idealized world where all parties get black-box access to a truly random function. Unfortunately a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as a heuristic argument and, admittedly using quite contrived constructions, has been shown to possibly lead to insecure schemes when the random oracles are implemented in the standard model (see, e.g., [16] ). More importantly, there exist results [22] indicating that even certain standardized cryptographic schemes (such as full-domain hash signatures) will always remain in the grey area of schemes having a proof in the random oracle yet are "provably unprovable" in the standard model. IBE Without Random Oracles. Waters [41] presents the first practical IBE that is chosen-plaintext secure without random oracles. It fits the category of "commutative-blinding" IBE schemes from Boneh and Boyen [8] and its chosen-plaintext security can be reduced to the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption. Based on Waters scheme several chosen-ciphertext secure IBE schemes were proposed starting with generic constructions [10] whose specific instantiations were later improved [15, 30] . Today's most efficient variant is due to Kiltz and Galindo who successfully applied "direct chosenciphertext" techniques from [15, 29] to Waters' IBE scheme. More recently, Gentry [23] proposed yet another practical chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme based on the class of "inversion-based" IBE schemes from [8] , offering interesting efficiency trade-offs compared to the commutative-blinding schemes [30] .
Random Oracles: Theory vs. Practice. The above mentioned drawbacks of the random oracle model readily leads to the question why random-oracle based schemes are sometimes chosen over schemes with a rigorous proof in the standard model. The answer is straight-forward: it is common knowledge that schemes in the random-oracle model are usually much more efficient than schemes in the standard model. As long as the "theoretical problems" from [16, 22] do not lead to an actual break of a nonartificial scheme, using random-oracle schemes seems justifiable in practice. On the other hand it is in the belief of the authors that this general perception about random oracles will change when alternative random-oracle free schemes become available that offer competitive performance. 
Our contributions
In this paper we demonstrate that there exist identity-based encryption schemes that are provably secure in the standard model, yet their performance is competitive with the best schemes in the random oracle model. We propose two constructions of chosen-ciphertext secure IBE schemes which outperform all such existing standard-model schemes, and have performance comparable to the random-oracle based schemes that were described above.
Scheme I. Our first IBE scheme is based on Waters' semantically secure IBE. Our approach to protecting a ciphertext against chosen ciphertext attacks bears some resemblance to the one used by Cramer and Shoup [20, 21] to obtain chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption. More precisely, we use the more efficient "encrypt-then-mac" or "authenticated symmetric encryption" variant proposed by Kurosawa and Desmedt [31] . More precisely, in our construction decryption of ill-formed ciphertexts (i.e. ciphertexts that could not have been generated by the encryption algorithm) uses randomness which is built into the user private key (and is independent of the master public key). Such ill-Formed ciphertexts can be detected using extra-information that is algebraically encoded into the "identity-carrying" part of the ciphertext (similar to the HIBE construction from [9] ). Overall this allows us to obtain a CCA secure IBE scheme by only adding one exponentiation to the encryption/decryption algorithm of Waters' scheme, which is secure only against chosen plaintext attacks. We give a standard-model security proof reducing the intractability of the modified Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (mBDDH) problem (a problem closely related to BDDH) to breaking the CCA security of our scheme.
Scheme II. Our second construction is a variant of Gentry's chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme. Here our new contribution is to use authenticated symmetric encryption [31, 25] to reduce ciphertext expansion and encryption/decryption cost compared to Gentry's original schemes. We prove chosen-ciphertext security of our scheme with respect to the decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (q-ABDHE) assumption [23] in the standard model. We remark that the proof technique is significantly different from the one used for the first scheme.
Comparison
We carefully review all known chosen-ciphertext secure IBE constructions and make an extensive comparison with our schemes. Our studies also incorporate all relevant practical issues when making a comparison, including the tightness of the security reduction with respect to different assumptions and instantiating the schemes in asymmetric pairing groups. To obtain concrete comparison values we estimate ciphertext expansion and encryption/decryption cost when implemented in different pairing groups using recent (independent) timing data from [14] . This includes pairing groups based on super-singular curves and MNT curves.
The numerical results of our comparison for 80 bits MNT curves are given in Figure 1 (For 80 bits super-singular curves the results are similar. We refer the reader to Figure 6 in Section 6.) The figure shows that our schemes outperform all known IBE schemes in the standard model. Most notably, compared to the standard-model scheme KG from [30] decryption cost and ciphertext expansion is reduced by approximately one third, whereas encryption cost is the same. More importantly, in comparison with the random-oracle based schemes BF from [12] , BB 1 from [8, 14] , and KS from [36, 18] our schemes offer competitive performance in all parameters, yet are provably secure in the standard model.
Related work
A special class of authenticated symmetric encryption schemes which is obtained using the "encryptthen-mac" primitive was recently successfully applied to public-key encryption schemes by Kurosawa and Desmedt [31, 2] who greatly improved efficiency of the original Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [21] . Their result was generalized to cover arbitrary authenticated encryption schemes [25] . In fact, our second IBE scheme can be seen as the "Kurosawa-Desmedt variant" of the original CCA secure scheme by Gentry. A variant of it was also sketeched in independent work by Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg [7] using their general framework of "hash proof systems". In connection with IBE, authenticated encryption was first used in [37] . This paper is an extended version of an unpublished manuscript [28] by the first author.
Preliminaries

Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If S is a set then s ← R S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. Unless otherwise indicated, algorithms are randomized and polynomial time. By z ← R A O1,O2,... (x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running algorithm A with inputs x, y, . . . and access to oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . ., and letting z be the output. An adversary is an algorithm or a tuple of algorithms.
Identity Based Encryption
An IBE scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Enc, and Dec. Setup generates the global public and private keys; KeyGen uses the global private key to generate an individual private key PRI id for a given identity; Enc uses the global public key to encrypt a message to a given identity; and Dec uses the individual private key to decrypt ciphertexts.
The strongest and commonly accepted notion of security for an identity-based key encryption is that of indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack [12] . This notion, denoted IND-ID-CCA (or simply CCA), is captured by defining the following advantage function for an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), and for an IBE scheme IBE:
where Exp CCA IBE,A (k) is defined by the following experiment.
The oracle KeyGen(·) on input id generates a new private key for the identity id and returns it. The oracle Dec(·, ·) on input id and C first generates a new private key for id and then uses it to decrypt C. When A 1 outputs id * it must not be any of the identities that the adversary queried to the KeyGen(·) oracle. Furthermore, A 2 is not allowed to query the KeyGen(·) oracle on id * , and is not allowed to query For a more precise analysis of the tightness of reduction we will sometimes use the following more detailed notation. For integers k, t, q x , q d , Adv
, where the maximum is over all adversaries A that make at most t computational steps, q x key-derivation, and q d decryption queries. Here we make the convention to count all decryption queries for id = id * as a key-derivation query.
Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E, D) is specified by its encryption algorithm E (encrypting m ∈ MsgSp(k) with keys K ∈ K(k)) and decryption algorithm D (returning m ∈ MsgSp(k) or ⊥). Here we restrict ourselves to deterministic algorithms E and D.
The most common notion of security for symmetric encryption is that of ciphertext indistinguishability, which requires that all efficient adversaries fail to distinguish between the encryptions of two messages of their choice. Another common security requirement is ciphertext authenticity. Ciphertext authenticity requires that no efficient adversary can produce a new valid ciphertext under some key when given one encryption of a message of his choice under the same key. A symmetric encryption scheme which satisfies both requirements simultaneously is called secure in the sense of authenticated encryption (AE-OT secure). Note that AE-OT security is a stronger notion than chosen-ciphertext security.
The above requirements are formalized as follows:
Ciphertext Indistinguishability. Let SE = (E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary. We define the following experiment:
The advantage of A in breaking the ciphertext indistinguishability security of SE is: Ciphertext Authenticity. In this work we are only interested in one-time authenticated schemes. That is, schemes for which no efficient adversary can produce a new valid ciphertext after seeing the encryption of a single message. Let SE = (E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an algorithm. We define the following experiment:
The advantage of A in breaking the ciphertext integrity of SE is: Constructions. In our IBE constructions we will require an abstract notion of algebraic symmetric encryption where the key-space K consists of a cyclic group G T . It is well know (following the encrypt-then-mac approach [3, 21] ) how to build such symmetric encryption schemes satisfying all required functionality and security from the following basic primitives:
• A (computationally secure) one-time symmetric encryption scheme with binary k-bit keys (such as AES or padding with a PRNG) • A (computationally secure) MAC (existentially unforgeable) with k-bit keys • A (computationally secure) key-derivation function [21] that maps elements from G T into 2k-bit strings (such as SHA-1). We remark that for our purposes it is also possible to use a more efficient single-pass authenticated encryption scheme (see, e.g., [35] ). In both cases the the ciphertext expansion (i.e., ciphertext size minus plaintext size) of the AE-OT secure symmetric scheme is only k (security parameter) bits which is optimal with respect to our security notion.
Target Collision Resistant Hashing
It is assumed to be target collision resistant (TCR) [21] , which is captured by defining the advantage function Adv
Note that TCR is a weaker requirement than collision-resistance, so that, in particular, any practical collision-resistant function can be used. Commonly [21, 31] this function is implemented using a dedicated (non-keyed) cryptographic hash function like MD5 or SHA. To simplify notation we will sometimes drop the superscript key s and simply use TCR.
3 Intractability assumptions
Bilinear Groups
Our schemes will be parameterized by a pairing parameter generator. This is an algorithm G that on input 1 k returns the description of an multiplicative cyclic group G of prime order p, where 2 k < p < 2 k+1 , the description of a multiplicative cyclic group G T of the same order, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairinĝ e : G × G → G T . See [12] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We use G * to denote G \ {1}, i.e. the set of all group elements except the neutral element. Throughout the paper we use PG = (G, G T , p,ê, g, g T ) as shorthand for the description of bilinear groups, where g is a generator of G and g T =ê(g, g) ∈ G T .
The modified BDDH assumption
Let PG be the description of pairing groups. The Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption [12] states that the two distributions (g
, for x, y, z, r ← R Z p are indistinguishable for any adversary. For the modified BDDH assumption we furthermore provide the adversary with the element g (y 2 ) . More formally we define the advantage function Adv
where x, y, z, r ← R Z p and PG ← R G(1 k ). We say that the modified Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman (mBDDH) assumption relative to generator G holds if Adv mbddh G,B (·) is negligible for all adversaries B.
The truncated q-ABDHE assumption
Let q = q(k) be a polynomial. The q-BDDHI assumption [8] states that the two distributions (g x , . . . , g
, for x, r ← R Z p are indistinguishable for any adversary. In [23] Gentry proposed the related truncated decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (truncated q-ABDHE) assumption which augments the q-BDDHI assumption with additional information to the adversary. We define the advantage function Adv
where x, z, r ← R Z p and PG ← R G(1 k ). We say that the truncated q-ABDHE assumption relative to generator G holds if Adv
Relations
The next lemma classifies the strength of the modified BDDH assumption we introduced between the well known standard pairing-based assumptions BDDH and 2-BDDHI. Here "A ≤ B" means that assumption B implies assumption A (in a generic sense), i.e. assumption B is a stronger assumption than A.
The simple proof is postponed until Appendix B.3. We remark that the complexity of q-BDDHI (as well as truncated q-ABDHE) in the in the generic-group model [39] is roughly Ω( p/q) [8, 23] which matches the recent attack due to Cheon [19] .
IBE Scheme I
In this section we present our first CCA secure IBE scheme. It is based on the Boneh-Boyen "commutativeblinding" IBE scheme [8] in its full-identity secure variant of Waters [41] which is chosen-plaintext secure. We construct a CCA secure IBE by adding a redundant group element to the ciphertext, and authenticating the two group elements both explicitly, using target collision resistant hash function, and implicitly by using the same randomness to generate both elements.
A similar technique was already used by Cramer and Shoup to obtain chosen-ciphertext secure publickey encryption and later also successfully applied in [15, 29, 30] . All the above works make a distinction between ciphertexts that can be generated by the encryption algorithm (well-formed ciphertexts), and strings that the encryption algorithm would never output (ill-formed ciphertexts) in their security analysis. The first CCA secure IBE that applies this methodology is [30] . The IBE of [30] handles ill-formed ciphertexts by decrypting them to a fresh random value chosen by the decryption algorithm ("implicit rejection"). This approach is sufficient for obtaining CCA security, but is prohibitively expensive as it requires the decryption algorithm to be randomized, and to compute several exponentiations of group elements to handle ill-formed ciphertexts.
We avoid this additional computation by exploiting the fact that in our IBE the decryption of an illformed ciphertext depends on the randomness of the private key that was used for the decryption. In other words, we decrypt ill-formed ciphertexts in the same way as we would decrypt well-formed ciphertext, but for a well formed ciphertext the outcome of the decryption is independent of the randomness in
Figure 2: Our first CCA-secure IBE scheme IBE 1 . the private key. As a result our decryption algorithm is deterministic and significantly faster than [30] . Furthermore, our scheme also has one group element less in the ciphertext than [30] . This is achieved by algebraically integrating the implicit ciphertext consistency check into the part of the ciphertext that carries the information about the recipient's identity.
The IBE Construction
We assume that PG = (G, G T , p,ê, g, g T ) are public system parameters obtained by running the group parameter algorithm G(1 k ) (that may be shared among multiple systems). We review the hash function H : {0, 1} n → G used in Waters' identity based encryption schemes [41] . On input of G and an integer n, the randomized hash key generator HGen(G; n) chooses n + 1 random group elements h 0 , . . . , h n ∈ G and returns h = (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n ) ∈ G n+1 as the public description of the hash function. The algebraic hash function H : {0, 1} n → G is evaluated on a string id = (id 1 , . . . , id n ) ∈ {0, 1} n as the product
Let TCR : G → be a target collision-resistant hash function and SE = (E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme with key-space K = G T . Our IBE scheme IBE 1 with identity space IDSp = {0, 1} n is described in Figure 2 . Here it is understood that decryption rejects if the ciphertext C does not parse to (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) with c 1 ∈ G and c 2 ∈ G * . An IBE scheme with arbitrary identity space IDSp = {0, 1} * can be obtained by applying a collision-resistant hash function to the identities. (The choice of n = 2k is due to the birthday paradox.)
We now show correctness of the scheme, i.e. that the symmetric key K computed in the encryption algorithm matches the key K computed in the decryption algorithm.
1 A correctly generated secret key for identity id has the form
Therefore the decryption algorithm computes the symmetric key K as
1 Decryption rejects all ciphertexts with c 2 = 1 ∈ G. We can assume that encryption does not generate ciphertexts with c 2 = 1. In case it does encryption can pick fresh randomness r. Note that this implies that our encryption algorithm runs in expected polynomial time (rather then in strict polytime). However, this has little significance in practice since it is unlikely that for two independent choices of r we would get c 2 = 1.
which is the same as the key computed in the encryption algorithm. Now correctness of the scheme is implied by correctness of SE.
Security
Theorem 4.1 Assume TCR is a target collision resistant hash function and (E, D) is a AE-OT-secure symmetric scheme. Under the modified Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (mBDDH) assumption relative to generator G, the IBE scheme IBE 1 is CCA secure. In particular, for ε(k) = Adv
The full proof is given in Appendix A.1. We give a brief overview here. Our proof for this system has many similarities with [30] (which in turn is based on [41] ). The key difference between the two proofs is the treatment of ill-formed ciphertexts. [30] use the fact that anyone that has the global public key can check whether a ciphertext is well-formed. Then, if the ciphertext is ill-formed the decryption algorithm chooses a random value for K, and uses it to attempt and decrypt the symmetric ciphertext. Thus, the adversary himself could have decrypted any ill-formed ciphertext, and does not gain any information from querying the decryption oracle on such ciphertexts.
Our approach to dealing with ill-formed ciphertexts is different. We do not rely on the ability of anyone who has the global public key to check whether a ciphertext is well-formed. Instead, we make the observation that an ill-formed ciphertext, i.e. a ciphertext of the form
, where r = r ′ , decrypts in the following way:
(r−r ′ )s , where s is the random value that was used to generate the private key.
2. K is used to attempt and decrypt the AE ciphertext. Now, the adversary makes a polynomial number of decryption queries with ill-formed ciphertexts. We show that the first such query is likely to decrypt as "reject", and each query after the first is likely to decrypt as "reject" given that all previous ill-formed queries decrypted as reject, which completes the proof. The idea is that the value s remains random in the view of the adversary as he makes decryption queries with valid ciphertexts, or ciphertexts that decrypt as "reject". Since s is random, K is also a random element of G T . Thus, by the authenticity property of the AE encryption, c 3 will be decrypted to "reject" when the random element K is used as the key.
Extensions
Trading Public Key Size and Security Reduction
As independently discovered in [17, 33] , there exists an interesting trade-off between key-size of Waters' hash H and the security reduction of the IBE schemes. The construction modifies Waters hash H as follows: Let the integer l = l(k ) be a new parameter of the scheme. In particular, we represent an identity id ∈ {0, 1} n as an n/l-dimensional vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id n/l ), where each id i is an l bit string.
Waters hash is then redefined to H : {0,
for random public elements h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n/l ∈ G. Waters' original hash function is obtained as the special case l = 1. It is easy to see that using this modification in our IBE scheme (i) reduces the size of the public key from n + 2 to n/l + 2 elements in G, whereas (ii) it adds another multiplicative factor of 2 l to the security reduction of the IBE scheme (Theorem 4.1).
For concreteness we propose the following value for l (our choice will become clear in Section 6). For a scheme implemented in groups offering 80 bits of security we have n = 2 · 80 = 160 bits and use 128. This shrinks the public-key size to reasonable n/l + 2 ≈ 10 elements in G (plus one element in G T ).
We further remark that in the random-oracle model we can replace Waters' hash H : {0, 1}
, where RO : {0, 1} * → Z p is a cryptographic hash function which is modeled as a random oracle [4] in the security analysis.
Hierarchical Identities
Hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) is a generalization of IBE to identities supporting hierarchical structures [26] . In a HIBE, identities are hierarchical and take the form id = [id 1 By the relation to Waters IBE scheme it is easy to see that our technique can also be used to obtain a chosen-ciphertext secure HIBE. Using a technique from [9] it is furthermore possible to reduce the HIBE ciphertext size to three elements, i.e. it is independent of the hierarchy's depth. To be more precise, the IBE from Section 4.1 is modified to a HIBE supporting maximal d hierarchies as follows. The setup algorithm chooses d different and independent hash functions H i ← R HGen(G; n), for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. The user secret key for the hierarchical identity id = [id 1 
. We remark that the latter (n+1)·(d−µ−1) elements d ij are only needed for hierarchical key delegation (and may be not included in PRI id if such a feature is not wanted). Encryption of m with respect to id computes the two ciphertext elements c 1 = g r and c 2 = (u t µ j=1 H i (id (j) )) r and uses the key K = z r to compute the symmetric ciphertext (using an AE-OT-secure scheme). Decryption . As in [24, 41 ] the security reduction is exponential in the depth d of the hierarchy, i.e. it introduces, roughly, a multiplicative factor of (nq) d . Hence the scheme can only be considered practical for small hierarchies, say of depth d = 4.
Trading ciphertext size for efficiency
A variant of our IBE scheme can be combined with CCA-secure symmetric encryption. CCA-secure symmetric encryption is less demanding than authenticated encryption and, in particular, strong pseudorandom permutations imply CCA-secure symmetric encryption without any redundancy. This has the advantage of more compact ciphertexts while decryption has to perform some algebraic consistency checks and is therefore less efficient.
IBE Scheme II
In this section we present our second chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme from the q-ABDHE assumption. It is based on the Boneh-Boyen "exponent inversion" IBE scheme [8] in its full-identity secure variant of Gentry [23] . Building on techniques by Cramer and Shoup [21] , Gentry also presents a chosenciphertext secure variant of his basic chosen-plaintext secure scheme. Our main improvement is to combine it with a strongly secure symmetric encryption scheme to considerably reduce ciphertext size and encryption/decryption cost.
The IBE construction
Let PG = (G, G T , p,ê, g, g T =ê(g, g)) be a pairing group. Let TCR : G × G → Z p be a target collisionresistant hash function. Let (E, D) be a symmetric cipher. Our IBE scheme IBE 2 = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) with identity space IDSp = Z p is depicted in Figure 3 .
Figure 3: Our CCA-secure IBE scheme IBE 2 .
To show correctness consider a ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) generated for identity id that gets decrypted with a valid user secret key PRI id = (d 1 , d 2 , s 1 , s 2 ) by computing the symmetric key K as follows
as in the encryption algorithm.
Security
Theorem 5.1 Assume TCR is a target collision resistant hash function and (E, D) is a AE-OT-secure symmetric scheme. Let q = q x + 1, where q x is the number of key-derivation queries. Under the truncated q-ABDHE assumption relative to generator G, the IBE scheme IBE 2 is IND-CCA secure. In particular, we have
The proof of Theorem 5.1 will be given in Appendix A.2. We give some intuition why the scheme is IND-CCA secure. First, the proof of Gentry [23] can be used to show that user secret-key queries, as well as consistent decryption queries for the challenge identity id * are basically useless for an adversary attacking the scheme (unless it can efficiently solve the q-ABDHE problem). However, inconsistent decryption queries with respect to the challenge identity id * may leak information about the hidden bit b. Here we use a Cramer-Shoup argument. The idea is that the user secret-key
used to answer such decryption queries contains some internal randomness (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p that is initially hidden from the adversary's view. During the simulation of the IND-CCA environment the challenge ciphertext will leak (in an information-theoretic sense) one linear equation on the hidden randomness (s * 1 , s * 2 ). Decryption queries of inconsistent ciphertexts will use a key K for symmetric decryption that is computed as a linear equation in s * 1 , s * 2 which is linearly independent from the equation the adversary knows. Hence, one single key K is uniformly distributed over G T . By the ciphertext authenticity property of SE the adversary will not be able to come up with an inconsistent ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) such that D K (c 3 ) does not reject. Consequently, all inconsistent ciphertext will get rejected by the scheme.
Extensions
Using techniques from [1] it is further possible to prove IBE 2 anonymous in the sense that the ciphertext does not leak any information about the sender's identity. This property has recently proved useful in the area of public-key encryption with keyword search [1] .
We remark that in contrast to the IBE construction from Section 4 it is not possible to trade algebraic consistency checks for a weaker symmetric encryption scheme. In general, the class of inversion-based IBE schemes are less versatile than the commutative-blinding IBE schemes; for example, adding extensions like hierarchical key delegation to inversion-based IBE schemes seems a difficult task.
Comparison
In this section we compare our schemes with known CCA-secure IBE schemes from the literature.
Considered schemes
We consider the following standard-model IBE schemes. 
KG:
The scheme from Kiltz and Galindo [30] .
Gentry:
The scheme from Gentry [23] (IND-CCA variant).
We furthermore consider the following three IBE schemes that only have a proof in the random-oracle model. All of them are currently in submission for the IEEE1363.3 standardization project [27] .
BF: The (FullIdent) scheme from Boneh and Franklin [12] .
The scheme from Boneh and Boyen [8] in its "hashed identities" variant [14] .
KS:
The scheme from Kasahara and Sakai [36] as described in [18] .
We remark that when assuming the interactive gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (gap-BDH) assumption efficiency of BF and BB 1 can be further improved [14] . Due to the strong assumption we will not consider those schemes.
Security reductions
For determining the parameters of the compared schemes, we make the following assumptions, most of the are conservative towards the efficiency of our new schemes. For k = 80 bit security we estimate (following Bellare and Rogaway [5] ) the number of (random oracle) hash queries as q H = 2 50 . This seems reasonable since a hash function is in the hand of an adversary and can be attacked offline. Similar to signatures schemes we think that a reasonable estimate for the number of key-derivation queries is q x ≈ 2 25 . This is much smaller than the number of hash queries since key-derivation queries can only be made online, in interaction with the system. In practice it is easy to limit the number of key-derivation queries.
The IBE schemes IBE 1 and KG have two additional integer parameters: n, l. Parameter n = 2k resembles the bit size n = 160 ≈ 2 7 of the identity space and l(k) defines the tradeoff between public parameters and security-reduction (cf. Section 4.3.1). We choose l = 18 to obtain a security loss of 2 18+7+25 = 2 50 = q H . This explains our choice of l(k): it is chosen such that the security loss of the above schemes matches the one of all random-oracle schemes.
The concrete security reductions are given in Figure 4 . For a fair comparison the security reductions of the random-oracle based schemes are given relative to the respective decisional assumption (e.g., BDDH instead of BCDH for BB 1 ). We note that the two schemes IBE 2 and Gentry have a tight security reduction to a much stronger security assumption. Due to the recent attacks by Cheon [19] it seems reasonable that the q-xxxx assumption are √ q times "less secure" than the BDDH assumption. This in particular implies (by Lemma 3.1) that we can treat the mBDDH assumption as "as secure" as the BDDH assumption. To simplify the comparison we make the conservative assumption that all the above schemes with the given parameters have the same security loss with respect to the BDDH assumption.
Scheme Standard Assumption
Security reduction Model?
Bounds concrete (k = 80)
Figure 4: Security assumptions and (concrete) reduction factors for IBE schemes.
Implementation details and curves
In pairing based cryptography efficiency always depends on the chosen curve and how well the scheme can be adapted to it. In particular, in asymmetric pairing groups the bilinear mapping is defined aŝ e : G ×Ĝ → G T , where elements inĜ need much larger representations than in G. We optimize all schemes with respect to short ciphertext sizes. See Figure 5 for concrete values. We note that whenever the IBE scheme can be proved secure when using a CCA-secure symmetric schemes, we assume it is instantiated with a redundancy-free scheme (cf. Section 2).
Boyen [14] computes estimated relative timings for all atomic asymmetric operations (exponentiations and pairings) and representation sizes for group elements when instantiated in super-singular curves [12] with 80 bits security (symmetric pairing groups) and MNT curves with 80 bits security [32, 13] (asymmetric pairing groups). In Figure 5 (right side) we recall the values from [14] . Here a ratio of pairings (sometimes also called multi-pairing) denotes the product of two pairings. For simplicity we decided not to take into account possible savings when performing fixed-based or multi exponentiations. Table 5 gives concrete values of encryption/decryption operations and ciphertext expansion for the considered IBE schemes. We note that for IBE 1 and KG, computing
l ) is counted as two exponentiations.
Results
A comparison with concrete timing values from Boyen [14] is carried out in Figure 1 (Section 1) and Figure 6 . Ciphertext overhead represents the difference (in bits) between the ciphertext length and the message length. All timings are given in multiplicative factors relative to one exponentiation in G. As usual, all symmetric operations (cryptographic hash function, symmetric encryption, etc) are ignored. All schemes come with a security proof based on different security assumption, furthermore introducing a different loss of security in the reduction, depending on several system parameters. A high loss in the security reduction reduces the real-world efficiency of the scheme by making it necessary to increase the size of the groups for any given security level. In order not to compare apples with pears, we attempted to pick the parameters (in particular the parameter l for IBE 1 and KG) such that we obtain the same concrete security reduction for all schemes. We conclude that our schemes are the most efficient chosen-ciphertext secure IBE schemes in the standard model. Furthermore its performance and ciphertext expansion seems comparable to the known random-oracle based schemes, in particular to the one by Boneh and Franklin which is intensively used in practice (see, e.g., http://www.voltage.com). the decryption oracle outputs "reject" (or ⊥). Furthermore, if the adversary makes a decryption query with c 1 = c * 1 before seeing the challenge, then the experiment is stopped and a random outcome is chosen. Let F 2 be the event that the experiment is stopped, and let F ′ 2 be the event that a ciphertext was rejected in Game 2 by the decryption oracle but would not have been rejected in Game 1. Game 1 and Game 2 proceed identically unless event F 2 ∨ F ′ 2 occurs; in particular, the events X 1 ∧ ¬(F 2 ∨ F ′ 2 ) and X 2 ∧ ¬(F 2 ∨ F ′ 2 ) are the same. Therefore we have:
It is easy to see that Pr[ Game 3. We call a ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) ill-formed with respect to identity id ifê(g, c 2 ) = e(c 1 , H (id )·u t ) where t = H(c 1 ). It is equivalent to saying that C is of the form (g r , (H (id )·u t ) r ′ , c 3 ) and r = r ′ . We call a decryption query ill-formed if it contains an ill-formed ciphertext.
Game 3 is the same as Game 2 except that we add the restriction that the adversary is not allowed to ask ill-formed decryption queries. We define a new adversary A 3 that simulates A and whenever A makes an ill-formed decryption query, A 3 responds with reject. To see how the probabilities of success of A 3 and A are related we define F 3 to be the event that A makes an ill-formed decryption query which would not have been rejected in Game 2 but is rejected in Game 3. Clearly, if event F 3 does not occur then A 3 simulates A perfectly, therefore we get |Pr[
Proof: Let (id , C), where C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), be an ill-formed decryption query. Let's consider the process of decrypting the ciphertext C. The value K is computed using the ciphertext and some private key PRI id * = (α · H (id * ) s , g −s , u s ) of the challenge identity in the following way:
The value s represents the randomness in the private key PRI id * . Notice that for well formed ciphertexts the intermediate key K is independent of s (it only depends on z r ). Thus, the adversary did not gain any information about s from any well-formed decapsulation queries that he has made. Now, consider previously failed ill-formed decryption queries. For each such query the adversary learns at best one Z p value which is not equal to s. Thus, after a polynomial number of failed ill-formed decryption queries, s remains almost uniformly distributed in Z p in the adversary's view. Using this, and the fact that c 2 = 1 we obtain that in the adversary's view K is distributed almost uniformly in G T . That is, the distance between the uniform distribution on G T and the distribution on K is ≤ q/p where q is the number of decryption queries that the adversary asks. Now, we know that the probability of A 3 generating an AE ciphertext c 3 such that it does not decrypt as "reject" when using a random K is ≤ Adv CT-INT SE,A,t (k). Thus, when using the almost random K that is obtained from decrypting as above we get that the probability of the ciphertext not decrypting as "reject" is ≤ Adv • To generate u, α, z two random exponents are chosen a, b ← Z p , and the following values are assigned: u ← g b ; α ← g ab ; z ←ê(g a , g b ).
• Let q = q x + q d be the total number of queries (private key and decryption) that the adversary makes. To generate h 0 , h 1 , ..., h n compute:
• (Forced abort) For an identity id let
We call F 4 the event that one of the following two conditions is true. If F 4 occurs then the experiment is aborted and the outcome is chosen randomly.
1. The adversary asks a private key query for an identity id such that y(id ) ≡ 0 mod q. 2. The adversary chooses a challenge identity id * such that y(id * ) ≡ 0 mod q.
• (Artificial Abort) Let view A be the adversary's random tape, and the transcript of its interactions with its oracles in the current run of the experiment of Game 4. Let Y = (y ′ , y 1 , ..., y n , k) where the random variables y ′ , y 1 , ..., y n , k are distributed as described above. Clearly, if we fix view A and rerun the experiment the random variable Y has the same distribution as for a run of the experiment without a fixed view of the adversary. This is true due to the random "masks" x i ∈ Z p . We define
Let λ = 1/4(n + 1)q, and let 0 < ρ(k) ≤ 1 be a function in k which will be specified later. Note that the values u, α, z, h 0 , h 1 , ..., h n as they are computed in Game 4 are distributed identically to the corresponding values in Game 3.
Claim A.2 Let q be the total number of private key and decryption queries made by the adversary. Then, |Pr[
Proof: The proof of this claim is somewhat technical, and is omitted here. We refer the reader to [30] for the proof (which is originally due to Waters [41] ).
Game 5. Game 5 is the same as Game 4 except that we change the way that private keys are computed, and the way that decryption queries are answered. Game 6. Game 6 is the same as Game 5 except that the value K * is replaced by a random valuẽ K ∈ G T which is chosen at the setup stage. Recall that K * in Game 4 is z r for some r ∈ Z p which is chosen randomly at the challenge stage. For clarity we will describe the computation of the challenge encryption from scratch:
For a key-derivation query KeyGen(·) for identity id i ∈ Z p (1 ≤ i ≤ q x = q − 1), B defines the two degree q − 1 polynomials
and returns
as the user secret key PRI idi = (d 1,idi , d 2,idi , s 1,idi , s 2,idi ) of id i , which can be computed from the values from Equation (3). This is a correct user secret key since (for j = 1, 2), d j,idi = g 2 ), using Equation (4) and answers all the decryption query as in the IND-CCA experiment. In total B will compute q x + 1 ≤ q user secret keys: q x for the key-derivation queries and one for the challenge identity id * . Since f 1 (X) and f 2 (X) are random degree q polynomials, for all q x + 1 ≤ q key-derivation queries the values s j,idi = f j (id i ) are uniform elements in Z p and hence the established user secret keys have the correct distribution.
For generation of the challenge ciphertext for id * ∈ Z p , B proceeds as follows. It defines the degree q + 1 polynomial
The challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 
where the challenge key K * is computed from c * 1 , c * 2 as in Equation (2) and b is a random bit. Note that the challenge ciphertext can be entirely computed from B's input values from Equation (3). Adversary B runs A 2 on input (C * , St), answering all oracle queries as above, and inputing a bit b ′ . Finally, B outputs 1 if b = b ′ and 0, otherwise.
We make the following claim that completes the proof of the lemma: if T =ê(g z , g) x q+1 then A's view is the same as in Game 2. If T ∈ G T , then A's view is the same as in Game 4.
To prove the claim we have to consider the distribution of the challenge ciphertext in Games 2 and 4. Note that the element T only leaks through B's simulation in the element c * 2 from the challenge ciphertext. We write c * 1 as
for r 1 = zF * (x). If T =ê(g z , g)
is a consistent ciphertext for identity id * , as in Game 2. On the other hand, if T is a uniform element in G T so is c * 2 , as in Game 4. This proves the claim.
